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Giving credit where it’s due
Following the recent decision in  Murphy v Gooch, 
Mark Pawlowski asks what principles govern entitlement 
to an occupation rent when parties have separated
‘The decision in Murphy
confirms the modern trend
of awarding occupation
rent as a matter of course
in cases where there has
been a breakdown of the
relationship and one 
party has left the other 
in sole occupation of the
joint home.’
Mark Pawlowski is a
barrister and professor 
of property law at the
University of Greenwich
PROPERTY
O
ccupation rent may be payable
when one party has been pre-
vented from living in a family
home in which they have an interest  and
a right of occupation. Generally, consid-
eration will be given to the payment of
an occupation rent where the party in
occupation has ‘ousted’ the other, as
opposed to circumstances in which the
party remaining in occupation did not
seek the departure of the other party. An
occupation rent may be payable by the
party that remains in the home to com-
pensate the ousted party for the loss of
benefit of being able to live in the home. 
There are two key questions when
considering occupation rent:
(1) Is proof of ouster from occupation a
prerequisite to an occupation rent?
(2) How is the size of the credit calcu-
lated?
Until recently, it was thought that
entitlement to an occupation rent was
governed by the doctrine of equitable
accounting, which comprises a set of
rules of convenience aimed at achieving
justice between co-owners on separa-
tion. The normal practice has been to
allow the occupying spouse (or partner)
to take credit for repayments of the
mortgage capital after separation, the
interest element being set off against the
liability to pay an occupation rent to the
outgoing spouse. 
The House of Lords’ ruling in Stack v
Dowden [2007], however, altered the basis
on which the relevant principles are to be
applied. Their Lordships unanimously
concluded that the court’s power to order
payment to a co-owner in occupation is no
longer determined by the doctrine of equi-
table accounting but is instead governed
by the statutory principles set out in s15 of
the Trusts of Land and Appointment of
Trustees Act 1996 (the 1996 Act). 
The recent decision of the Court of
Appeal in Murphy v Gooch [2007] is the
first case at appellate level to consider
this new approach involving a co-
owner’s entitlement to credit from her
former partner, who remained in sole
occupation of the joint home.
Previous case law
Earlier cases have established that an
occupational rent will be charged where
the party in occupation has actually or
constructively excluded the other part
from occupation: see Dennis v McDonald
[1982]. However, the obligation to pay an
occupation rent has not been restricted to
so-called ‘ouster’ cases, in which a marital
association has broken down and one
party has been deliberately driven out
from the family home. 
The adoption of a less rigid approach
is, perhaps, best illustrated by the deci-
sion of Millett J (as he then was) in Re
Pavlou [1993] – where he concluded that
an enquiry into the payment of an occu-
pational rent could be made in any case
where it was necessary to do broad jus-
tice between the parties. In his view, a
‘forceful exclusion’ was by no means
conclusive and, in the context of the
matrimonial home where the marriage
had ended:
… the party who leaves the property will,
in most cases, be regarded as excluded
from the home, so that an occupational
rent should be paid by the co-owner who
remains. 
Thus, in his view, the presentation of a
divorce petition by the occupying spouse
would normally be enough to signify a
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refusal to take the outgoing partner 
back into the matrimonial home and,
therefore, a willingness to pay an occu-
pation rent from the date of its issue. On
the other hand, such a liability would 
clearly be inappropriate in circumstances
where a spouse left voluntarily and
would be welcome back by the occupy-
ing partner so as to be able to enjoy their
right to occupy. 
The more relaxed approach towards
charging occupation rent in order to do
equity between the parties is also evi-
dent in Re Byford [2003], where the court
ordered the payment of an occupation
rent in favour of the husband’s trustee
in bankruptcy despite there being no
marriage breakdown or ouster.
Stack v Dowden
In Stack the parties had been living
together as man and wife for a number
of years and had four children. Their
house had been bought as a home for
them both and the children. When the
parties eventually separated, three of
the children were still minors. 
Mr Stack obtained rented accommo-
dation elsewhere and Miss Dowden
continued to be responsible for the
upkeep and outgoings on the home
until it was sold. Significantly, Mr Stack
had nothing to pay in respect of the
upkeep of the home until he was able to
realise his share on the sale. 
House of Lords decision
On these facts, the majority of the
House of Lords (Lord Neuberger dis-
senting) refused to make an order
requiring the payment of an occupation
rent to Mr Stack to compensate him for
his exclusion. 
Statutory basis for the ruling
All members of the House of Lords con-
cluded that the appropriate approach
was to look at the relevant provisions of
the 1996 Act. In this connection, s12(1)
gives a beneficiary, who is beneficially
entitled to an interest in land, the right
to occupy it if the purpose of the trust is
to make the land available for their
occupation. Section 13(1) and (2) gives
trustees the power to exclude or restrict
this entitlement so long as it is exercised
reasonably. The trustees also have
power, under s13(3), to impose condi-
tions on the occupier, including the
payment of outgoings or expenses in
respect of the land and paying compen-
sation to a person whose right to
occupy has been excluded or restricted:
see s13(5) and (6). 
Significantly, both trustees and benefi-
ciaries can apply to court for an order
declaring the nature and extent of a
person’s interest in the land subject to the
trust and it is here that the court’s statu-
tory jurisdiction to take accounts between
co-owners is limited by reference to a
number of important factors set out in
s15(1), namely:
(a) the intentions of the person(s) who
created the trust;
(b) the purposes for which the property
subject to the trust is held;
(c) the welfare of any minor who occu-
pies or might reasonably be expected
to occupy the property as their
home; and
(d) the interests of any secured creditor
of any beneficiary.
In addition, in relation to any appli-
cation relating to the exercise by
trustees of the powers conferred by s13,
the court must also have regard to the
wishes of each of the beneficiaries who
is entitled to occupy the land: see s15(2).
In the case of other applications, the 
circumstances and wishes of any benefi-
ciaries of full age entitled to an interest
in possession must also be considered:
see s15(3). The upshot of the foregoing
is that the court is no longer concerned
only with considerations relevant to
achieving justice between the parties,
but must take on board (in achieving a
just result) the wider criteria set out in
s15 – in particular, the welfare of any
minors, the interests of any secured
creditors and the circumstances and
wishes of the beneficiaries.
In Stack, both parties had the right to
occupy the family home. As trustees,
they initially agreed, pursuant to s13(1)
of the 1996 Act and by means of a con-
sent order, that Mr Stack should be
excluded from the home and that Miss
Dowden should pay him £900 per
month as recompense for his cost of
renting alternative accommodation.
When that order expired, they failed to
reach further agreement and so the
decision whether to require compensa-
tion became a matter for the court under
s14(1). The main consideration of the
majority in refusing compensation was
the need for the children to remain in
their home, under the care of the
mother, until the house was sold. The
conduct of the sale was with her 
and there was nothing to suggest she 
was delaying a sale. Lord Neuberger, 
however, dissented on this point, 
concluding that Miss Dowden had
excluded Mr Stack against his will, forc-
ing him to incur the cost of alternative
accommodation. Moreover, in his view,
the agreed payment of £900 per month
(as a quid pro quo for his exclusion) gov-
erned the matter as circumstances had
not really changed after the expiry of
the consent order. 
Murphy v Gooch
Here the parties (an unmarried couple)
had bought a house as their family
home in 1991. Two years later, their 
relationship broke down and Miss
Murphy left the property. Since then,
Mr Gooch had made all payments on
the house, including interest instal-
ments under the mortgage, rent paid to
a housing association (which owned a
share in the property) and payments
under a mortgage policy. 
Miss Murphy now sought a declara-
tion that she and Mr Gooch were
entitled to the property as tenants in
common in equal shares, and an order
The main consideration of the majority in refusing
compensation in  Stack was the need for the children
to remain in their home, under the care of the
mother, until the house was sold.
Readers interested in the Stack v Dowden
judgment will find an analysis of the case by
Elissa Da Costa in the June 2007 issue of
Family Law Journal.
Reference point
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expenses and outgoings met by Mr
Gooch during the whole period of his
continuing (sole) occupation.
Conclusion
Although the statutory powers contained
in ss12-15 of the 1996 Act have now
replaced the old doctrine of equitable
accounting, it is unlikely that this will
lead to different results in practice. This
was the conclusion reached by Baroness
Hale in Stack. Lord Neuberger was more
emphatic, suggesting that it would be a
‘rare case’ where the statutory criteria
would produce a different outcome from
that which would have resulted under
the previous case law applying equitable
principles. The recent decision in Murphy
bears this out – although the matter was
decided by reference to the statutory
principles, Lightman J considered a like
result would have followed under the
earlier law.
The decision in Murphy confirms the
modern trend of awarding occupation
rent as a matter of course in cases where
there has been a breakdown of the rela-
tionship and one party has left the other
in sole occupation of the joint home. 
The rationale here is that the absent
partner can no longer realistically occupy
the property and they must therefore
incur the expense of securing another
home. It is enough, therefore, that the
parties’ circumstances will make shared 
occupation impossible from a practical
standpoint. ■
for sale. She also sought a further order
that, if Mr Gooch continued in occupa-
tion of the property, his continued
occupation should be subject to the con-
dition (inter alia) that he should pay her
such sum as the court thought fit as
compensation for her exclusion from
the property. 
First instance decision
At first instance, the judge held that Mr
Gooch was entitled to credit in respect
of the payments he had made in respect
of the various outgoings on the house,
but that there should be offset against
those credits one-half of all the pay-
ments by way of an occupation rent.
Appeal decision
On appeal, the first substantive issue
was whether Miss Murphy’s claim for
an occupation rent was barred by
reason of an absence of any ouster from
the premises. On this point Lightman J
(giving the judgment of the court) con-
cluded that a court could order credit
for occupation rent if it was just to do
so, regardless whether there was proof
of ouster. 
In reaching this conclusion, Lightman
J was mindful of the earlier cases,
notably Pavlou and Byford, which made 
it clear that ‘an occupation rent 
may be ordered in any case where 
this is necessary to do broad justice or
equity between the parties’. In any 
event, even if ouster were necessary, it
was apparent that Miss Murphy had 
left the property on the breakdown of 
her relationship with Mr Gooch and,
accordingly, she was to be regarded as
constructively excluded from the date of
separation.
Calculation of credits
This then left the question of calculation
of the parties’ respective credits. On this
point, Lightman J concluded that the
statutory principles stated in s15(1) of
the 1996 Act had to be applied:
The wider ambit of relevant considera-
tions means that the task of the court
must now be, not merely to do justice
between the parties, but to do justice
between the parties with due regard to
the relevant statutory considerations…
Applying, therefore, the criteria set
out in s15(1) and mentioned above,
Lightman J noted that both parties (as
creators of the trust) had bought the
house as their joint home (a purpose
that had failed since 1993 when they
separated) and that Mr Gooch had,
since that date, occupied the property
alone as his home. So far as the interests
of any creditor were concerned, it was
apparent that the mortgagee’s interest
would not be prejudiced by the out-
come of the proceedings and, in
particular, the success (or otherwise) of
Miss Murphy’s claim to set off occupa-
tion rent against Mr Gooch’s outgoings
or a sale of the property. 
The final consideration related to the
circumstances and wishes of the parties.
In this connection it was apparent that,
while both were in financial difficulties
and Miss Murphy wanted a sale, Mr
Gooch was anxious to avoid a sale of his
longstanding home. Taking everything
into account, his Lordship concluded that
there was no good reason for limiting
Miss Murphy’s right to a set-off to only
one-half of the credits to which Mr Gooch
was entitled. Accordingly, he ordered 
an entitlement to a set-off against the
entirety of the credits representing costs,
In  Murphy it was apparent that Miss Murphy had 
left the property on the breakdown of her
relationship with Mr Gooch and, accordingly, she
was to be regarded as constructively excluded from
the date of separation.
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• The court may order payment of an occupation rent regardless of whether there is
proof of ouster.
• The court’s power to order payment of an occupation rent is no longer governed by the
doctrine of equitable accounting.
• The statutory criteria set out in s15 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees
Act 1996 now apply in achieving a just result between the parties.
Key points
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